Notes and Comments by Law Review, North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 12 | Number 1 Article 8
12-1-1933
Notes and Comments
North Carolina Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Notes and Comments, 12 N.C. L. Rev. 44 (1933).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol12/iss1/8
44 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the total of 57 in the class, 18 have college degrees, 3 have had 4 years
of college work, 28 have had three years, 5 have had two years under
the temporary exception in the trustees' regulation setting up a three-
year entrance requirement, and 3 are special students.
The visiting professors in the summer session of 1933 included:
Ralph Fuchs, Washington University, St. Louis; Albert C. Jacobs,
Columbia University; Roscoe Turner Steffen, Yale University; and
William E. McCurdy, Harvard University. Professor R. H. Wettach
spent the summer teaching Constitutional Law and Conflict of Laws
at the Northwestern University Law School. Professor M. S.
Breckenridge was again engaged in research for the Interstate Com-
merce Committee of the House of Representatives. Professor Albert
Coates is absent on leave during the fall semester in order that he
may devote his time to the Institute of Government.
The University of North Carolina Press has just published
Lynching and the Law by Assistant Professor J. H. Chadbourn. It
is a study of the operation and effectiveness of the judicial process
and the special legislation in relation to lynching, and concludes with
a suggested model anti-lynching law for adoption by the several
states. The study is the fruit of three years of co6peration between
the Law School and the Southern Commission on Lynching.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Delegation of Legislative Power to President
Under National Industrial Recovery Act.
The provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act which
tend to effectuate its policy are to be found in those sections which
provide for the promulgation of compulsory codes and the issuance
of licenses upon the discovery of specified abuses.' Congress has
put both these weapons into the hands of the President, and this in-
quiry concerns the validity of such delegation as tested by precedent. 2
'48 STAT. 196 (d) (1933), 151 U. S. C. A. §703 (d) and 48 STAT. 197 (b)
(1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §704 b). The scope of this note is confined to the
question of delegation. For the purposes of discussion, it is assumed that Con-
gress had the power to pass the act as to its other aspects.
The cases examined yield no clear cut definition of what is or is not
legislative. In the last analysis, it 'would seem that the outcome of each case
depends on the attitude of the court upon the question involved in the particular
legislation. See Parke v. Bradley, 204 Ala. 455, 86 S. 28 (1920) ("The limits
beyond which a legislative may go havenever been clearly defined").
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It is asserted as a truism that there can be no delegation of legis-
lative power a But such prohibition is said to include only the leg-
islative prerogative of policy forming.4  Any power not legislative
in character which the legislature may exercise, it may delegate. 5
Such delegations of power as the following have been upheld: fact
finding,6 the making of rules and regulations, even where the legis-
lature has provided that these violations shall be punishable,7 the
working out of administrative details8 and a determination of whether
the occasion exists for executing the law.9
One of the tests of the validity of such delegation is the "com-
pleteness of the statute."' 0 Some say, if the subject matter has been
acted upon as far as is practical, the statute will be upheld." It has
' Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. ed. 294 (1892) ; Com-
monwealth v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 194 Ky. 34, 237 S. W. 1086; Durham
Provision Co. v. Daves, 190 N. C. 7, 128 S. E. 593 (1925).
' Parker v. Bradley, 204 Ala. 455, 86 So. 28 (1920) ; State v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969 (1908) ; State v. Moorer, 152 S. C. 455,
150 S. E. 269 (1929).
U. S. v. Grimand, 220 U. S. 506, 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L. ed. 563 (1910);
Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565 (1908) ; Monroe v.
Withycombe,-84 Ore. 328, 165 P. 227 (1917).
'Union Bridge Co.. v. U. S., 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 361, 51 L. ed. 523
(1907) ; Monongahella Bridge Co. v. U. S. 216 U. S. 177, 30 Sup. Ct. 356, 54
L. ed. 435 (1910) ; J. W. Hampton & Co. v. U. S., 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct.
348, 72 L. ed. 624 (1928) , Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Com., 258
Fed. 307, 169 C. C. A. 323 (1919); Amchanitsky v. Carrougher, 3 Fed. Supp.
999 (E. D. N. Y. (1933) (In this case the Economy Act of Congress, 5 U. S.
C. A. §673, providing for the reduction of Federal employers' salaries, is held
constitutional).
'U. S. v. Grimand, supra note 5; I. C. C. v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U. S.
194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436, 56 L. ed. 729 (1912) ; United States v. Calisbad Packers,
4 Fed. Supp. 660 (N. D. Col. 1933) (The Agricultural Adjustment Act [7 U. S.
C. A. §§601-619] is not unconstitutional because of an invalid delegation of
legislative power) ; State v. Atlantic C. L. R. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969
(1908) (The Commission itself may not prescribe a penalty) ; Durham Pro-
vision Co. v. Daves, supra note 3.
'I); re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 17 Sup. Ct. 444, 41 L. ed. 813 (1897) (design
of stamp used for oleomargarine) ; Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N. E. 851
(1901) (number and location of fire escapes); Steele v. Louisville & M. R.
Co., 54 Tenn. 208, 285 S. W. 582 (1926) (designate form of railroad crossing
sign).
'U. S. v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 1, 71 L. ed. 131
(1926).
" People v. Barnett, 344 Ill. 62, 176 N. E. 1108 (1931) ; Welton v. Hamilton,
344.1IU. 82, 176 N. E. 333 (1931) (The term "complete" is used to mean almost
anything. It may mean merely a declaration of policy exists in the statute or,
as in this case, it may include the existence of a policy and a sufficient standard
to carry it into effect) ; Steele v. Louisville & M. R. Co., supra note 8. (The
maxim that the law must be complete when coming from the legislature means
that the duties or privileges must be definitely fixed or determined or rules for
fixing and determining them clearly established).
Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349, 48 L. ed. 525
(1904).
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also been said that the permissibility of delegation may vaty with the
scope and authority of the delegating body.12 But the most frequent
inquiry is the existence of a standard definite enough to effectuate
the legislative will. It is generally said that the statute should pre-
scribe a definite rule of action for the guidance of any discretionary
power conferred.' 3 But even in such cases the precision of a crim-
inal statute is not required. 1 4 An exception to the above rule is recog-
nized where the problem involved is technical' 5 or where it is difficult
or impractical to lay down some definite rule.' 6 Even where such
special conditions do not exist, some courts accept the most flimsy of
standards. 17 Still other courts have held that a general standard
can be dispensed with entirely since exercise of a reasonable dis-
cretion will be implied.' 8
In the past, the tendency in administrative licensing, has been
towards a greater observation of the requirement of a fixed standard,
than in other administrative functions. The doctrine is frequently
re-iterated that a statute which purports to vest an absolute dis-
cretion in an official to license a lawful enterprise is invalid.' 9 There
must be a uniform rule of action except where it is difficult or im-
practical to establish one.2 0 A liberal delegation of discretion is
also considered appropriate where the regulation of the government's
"Ruggles v. Collier, 43 Mo. 353 (1869).
' Welton v. Hamilton, supra note 10; Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212
Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565 (1908).
" Tarpay v. McClure, 190 Cal. 521, 213 P. 983 (1923); State v. Public
Service Com. 94 Wash. 274, 162 P. 523 (1917).
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283, 68 L. ed. 549 (1924) ; U. S.
v. Cohen Grocery Co. 255 U. S. 81, 41 Sup, Ct. 298, 65 L. ed. 516 (1921).
'Avent v. U. S. 266 U. S. 127, 45 Sup. Ct. 34, 69 L. ed. 202 (1924);
Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, supra note 13.
; Red C. Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380, 32 Sup. Ct. 152, 56 L. ed.
240 (1912) (oil to be safe, pure and to afford satisfactory light); Mahler v.
Eby, supra note 14 (undesirable residents) ; New York Central Securities Co.
v. U. S., 287 U. S. 12, 53 Sup. Ct. 45 (1932) (Public interest) ; Sears Roebuck
& Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., supra note 6 (authority to stop unfair methods
of competition); Spencer-Sturta Co. v. City of Memphis, 155 Tenn. 70, 290
S. W. 608 (1927) (the ordinance by requiring the board to follow "fundamen-
tal purpose and intent of the ordinance," provided sufficient guide); State
ex rel Central Steam Heat & Pr. Co. v. Gettle, 196 Wisc. 1, 220 N. V/. 201
(1898.)
State v. Whitman, 196 Wisc. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1928).
Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. ed. 220 (1886);
Bizzell v. Board of Aldermen of City of Goldsboro, 192 N. C. 348, 135 S. E.
50 (1926) ; Village of St. Johnsbury v. Aron, 103 Vt. 22, 151 Atl. 650 (1930);
Thompson v. Smith 155 Va. 367, 154 S. E. 579 (1930).
" Mutual Film Corp. v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 230, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 59 L. ed. 552
(1915) (due to numerous types of pictures, it would be impossible to devise
language which would be comprehensive and automatic); Ex parte Whitley,
144 Cal. 167, 77 Pac. 879 (1904) ; State v. Briggs, 45 Ore. 366, 77 Pac. 750
(1904).
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own resources are concerned.2 1 On the other hand, in businesses
which are a matter of privilege rather than of right, a larger dis-
cretion is granted in order to protect the public health, morals, safety
or welfare.22 Statutes are upheld which confer authority to make
rules and regulations and to license in pursuance to them. 28  And in
the licensing of both lawful pursuits and those within the police
power, where there is no uniform rule or even the existence of a
general one, the discretion conferred is often upheld on the ground
that a public official will be presumed to exercise his power impar-
tially and according to law.2 4 As a result of such attitude, the
courts will not pass on the validity of a licensing act, on the ground
that too much discretion has been given, unless there has been a
dereliction by officials in refusing a license.
25
There has been a growing trend to hold those cases of delegated
powers which have heretofore been in the twilight zone of uncer-
tainty, valid. It is pointed out that such shift of view is necessi-
tated by the complex situations created by modern society and busi-
ness. 26 The question is no longer whether there has been an invalid
delegation of power, but whether such delegation is necessary and
expedient due to the limited time and necessarily restricted knowl-
edge of the legislature and whether it is in the interest of greater
speed, efficiency, elasticity, and justice.
2 7
' Dastervigres v. U. S., 122 Fed. 30 (C. C. A. 9th, 1903) ; Port Royal Min-
ing Co v. Hagood, 30 S. C. 519, 9 S. E. 686 (1889); Vail v. Seaborg, 120
Wash. 126, 207 Pac. 15 (1922).
Davis v. Mass., 167 U. S. 43, 17 Sup. Ct. 731, 42 L. ed. 71 (1897) ; State
v. Sherow, 87 Kans. 235, 123 Pac. 866 (1912) ; State v. Hyde, 315 Mo. 681, 286
S. W. 363 (1926) ; State v. Fleming, 129 Wash. 64, 225, Pac. 647 (1924).
1 First Natl. Bk. v. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416, 37 Sup. Ct. 734, 61 L.
ed. 1233 (1917) ; State Racing Com. v. Latoma Agri. Assoc., 136 Ky. 173, 123
S. W. 681 (1909).
Lieberman v. Van deCarr, 199 U. S. 552, 26 Sup. Ct. 144, 50 L. ed. 305
(1905) ; Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U. S. 128, 31 Sup. Ct. 190, 55 L. ed. 128 (1911);
Hall v. Gieger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 Sup. Ct. 217, 61 L. ed. 480 (1917);
Schaake v. Dolley, 85 Kan. 598, 118 Pac. 80 (1911). (The courts are bound to'
take for granted the honesty and right mindedness of public officials chosen
directly or indirectly by the people to administer the law).
I Interstate Buses Corp. v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 273 U. S. 45, 47 Sup. Ct.
298, 71 L. ed. 530 (1927) ; Alaska Gold Mining Co. v. Territory of Alaska, 236
Fed. 64 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916); People v. Globe Grain & Milling Co.; 80 Cal.
625, 294 Pac. 3 (1930).
' Cook v. Burnquist, 242 Fed. 321 (1917) ; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Federal
Trade Com., supra note 6; State ex rel Jonason v. Crosby, 92 Minn. 176, 99
N. W. 636 (1904) ; Dillon Catfish Drainage District v. Bk. of Dillon, 143 S. C.
178, 141 S. E. 274 (1928); State v. Moorer, supra note 4; State v. Public
Service Com., supra note 15.
'Monongahela Bridge Co. v. U. S., supra note 6; Mutual Film Corp. v.
Kansas, supra note 20; Avent v. U. S., supra note 16; J. W. Hampton, Jr. and
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From all the foregoing one can only conclude that the provisions
in question are valid. The act starts with an extensive declaration
of policy, so that nothing essentially legislative has been left un-
done.28 The power to impose a compulsory code is to be exercised
only where it can be shown that there are abuses inimical to the
public interest and contrary to the policy of the act.29 And the
President is to license a business, only when it appears that it is
engaged in destructive price or wage cutting.3 0 The exercise of both
these powers is further limited by the requirement that any license
or code shall contain certain specified conditions.8 1 And in addition
the procedure to be used in arriving at these conditions is delin-
eated.3 2 The licensing power is further curtailed by the provision
that it shall expire within a year. Moreover, should anyone doubt
that the standard fixed is more than sufficient, would it not seem
reasonable to indulge in the presumption that the President will act
with fairness commensurate with the dignity of his office? There
are also cases available which sustain the delegation of unusually
large powers during periods of emergency 8 3 However, could the
provisions not be upheld under the most orthodox tenets, ample
justifications for them could still be found in the existing crisis and
sufficient precedent in the legislation enacted during the World War.
4
And finally, since the nondelegibility of legislative power is largely a
myth, why should it not be openly discarded by the courts ?
CEcirLa L. Pirz.
Co. v. U. S., supra note 6; State of Wisc. v. State of Ill. & Sanitary District
of Chicago, 278 U. S. 367, 49 Sup. Ct. 163, 73 L. ed. 426 (1929).
'48 STAT. 195 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §701.
248 STAT. 196 (a) (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §703 (a).
2048 STAT. 197 (b) (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §704 (b).
148 STAT. 198 (a) (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §707 (a).
SN. I. R. A. §7 (b), 7 (c). Id. (b) & (c).
"Avent v. U. S. supra note 16; Contract Cartage Co. v. Morris, 59 F. (2d)
437 (D. C. Ill. 1932) ; City of Chicago v. Mariotto, 332 Ill. 44, 163 N. E. 369
(1928); Blue v. Beach, 195 Ind. 121, 56 N. E. 89 (1900).
"New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U. S. 262, 282, 52 Sup. Ct. 371, 76
L. ed. 747 (1932) (dissent of Brandeis, J., "the people of the United States are
now confronted with an emergency more serious than war.") Selective Draft
Law Cases 245 U. S. 366, 38 Sup. Ct. 159, 62 L. ed. 349; (1918) ; U. S. v. Ford,
265 Fed. 424 (S. D. Ohio 1920); 40 U. S. Stat. L. 277, Chapter 53 §5 (Wilson
given the authority to regulate by licensing the importation, manufacture,
storage, mining or distribution of any necessaries); HART, THE ORmNANCE
MAKING POWERS OF THE PRESIMENT OF U. S.
'Trustees of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas E. L. & Pr. Co.; 19 N. Y.
123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908) ("The true meaning of constitutional division of gov-
ernmental powers being that the whole power of one of the three shall not be
exercised by the same hands which possess the power of either of other two,
there being no objection to the imposition on an administrative body of some
powers legislative in character.")
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Agency-Automobiles-Liability of a Cab-Calling Company
For the Torts of the Driver.
The defendant cab company owns no cars and hires no drivers,
but merely operates a calling service and sells the right to use its name
to private owners. The plaintiff is injured through the negligence
of the driver of a cab which bears the company's insignia, and which
she has ordered in response to one of its advertisements. The de-
fendant Jackson admits the ownership of the cab, and that it is reg-
istered in his name, but denies liability on the grounds that the car
was being operated by an independent contractor to whom he has
leased it. Held, both defendants liable on the theory of agency by
estoppel.'
Corporations similar to the one in the above case are becoming
increasingly common in our larger cities, especially the city of Wash-
ington, where a recent price war has had the effect of temporarily
eliminating some of the more responsible cab-owning companies. Per-
sons sustaining injuries through the negligent operation of these cabs
find it difficult to obtain redress, since the drivers are usually execu-
tion proof, and the company defends upon the grounds that the
drivers are not its agents, but independent contractors.2
When an actual agency can be shown, the plaintiff may recover
against the company, provided the tort was committed within the
scope of the agent's employment, under the familiar doctrine of
respondeat superior.2 Or, when the fact of agency is left in some
doubt, the plaintiff is aided by a presumption of agency which arises,
in most jurisdictions, upon proof that the defendant was the owner of
'Rhone v. Try Me Cab Co., 65 F. (2d) 834 (D. C. C. A., 1933).
'It is often very difficult to determine whether the relationship is that of
agent or independent contractor. In the latter case, as a general rule, there
can be no liability except in cases where an estoppel exists. However, the
mere fact that the driver operates on a commission basis, and has a great deal
of latitude in the conduct of the cab, will not constitute him an independent
contractor. Natchez Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Watson, 160 Miss. 173, 133 So.
677 (1931) ; Dunbaden v. Castles Ice Cream Co., 103 N. J. L. 427, 135 A. 886
(1927). Nor does it seem to alter the situation when the driver owns the car.
Montgomery v. Globe Grain & Milling Co., 293 P. 856 (Cal. App. 1930);
Lassen v. Stamford Transit Co., 102 Conn. 76, 128 A. 117. A few states have
passed statutes which make the owner of the car liable when it is being used
with his consent, regardless of agency. For a discussion of these statutes
(1926) 20 ILL. LAw Rxv. 405.
"Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215, 29 Sup. Ct. 252, 53 L. ed.
480 (1908).
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the cab,4 that it bears his name or insignia,5 that the driver wears
his uniform,6 or that the cab is registered in his name.7 When this
presumption is rebutted, as in the principal case, there are several
other possibilities. There may be such a concert of interest between
the driver and the company that the plaintiff can hold the latter upon
the theory of joint adventure.8 This is doubtful, however, due to the
fact that the company merely operates a calling service and sells the
right to use its name, while the conduct of the cab is left entirely with
the driver.
The theory of estoppel would seem the most likely one under the
facts presented in the principal case. There is clearly a holding out
by the defendant and a reliance up.on this by the plaintiff to her
detriment. 9 There is even the presence of a contractual element,
which is deemed necessary by some authorities.10 But in holding the
defendant Jackson, the court seems to go a step further, perhaps,
'Judson v. Bee Hive Auto Service Co., 136 Ore. 1, 294 P. 588, 297 P.
1050 (1930); Burger v. Taxicab Motor Co., 66 Wash. 676, 120 P. 519 (1912).
Contra: Welch v. Checker Taxi Co., 262 Mass. 310, 159 N. E. 622 (1928).
For a general discussion, HUDDY, AUTOMOBI.S (8th ed. 1927) §794; (1930) 8
N. C. L. REv. 309.
1 Voegeli v. Waterbury Yellow Cab Co., 111 Conn. 407, 150 A. 303 (1930)
Robeson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 257 Ill. App. 278 (1930); Weidnam v. St.
Louis Taxicab Co., 182 Mo. App. 523, 165 S. W. 1105 (1914) ; Misenheimer v.
Hayman, 195 N. C. 613, 143 S. E. 1 (1928); Bmuty, AUTOMOBILES (6th ed.
1929) §§1360-1361.
8 Teiman v. Red Top Cab Co., 3 P. (2d) 381 (Cal. App. 1931). Contra:
Welch v. Checker Taxi Co., supra note 4.
7 Irwin v. Pickwick Stage System, Inc., 21 P. (2d) 981 (Cal. 1933) ; Jones
v. Detroit Taxicab & Trans. Co., 218 Mich. 673, 188 N. W. 394 (1922).
8 Andrews v. Boedecker, 126 I1. 605, 18 N. E. 651 (1888) ; Koplitz v. City
of St. Paul, 86 Minn. 373, 90 N. W. 794 (1902) ; Stroher v. Elting, 97 N. Y.
102, 49 Am. Rep. 515 (1884) ; see Gallas v. Independent Taxi Owners Ass'n
et. al., 66 F. (2d) 192 (D. C. C. A. 1933).
'Maloney Tank Mfg. Co. v. Midcontinental Petroleum Corp., 49 F. (2d)
146 (C. C. A. 10th, 1931); Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hoover, 142 Md. 251, 120
A. 526 (1923); cf: Burgenthall v. State Garage & Trucking Co., 179 Wis. 42,
190 N. W. 901 (1922). Perhaps, the rule is best illustrated by a line of cases
in which department stores have advertised independently operated dentists's
offices or beauty shops as a part of the store. The few courts which have
passed on this question have uniformly held that an estoppel does arise in favor
of a person who has relied upon these representations and have been injured
through the negligence of the employes of the beauty shop or dentist's office.
Agusta Friedman's Shop v. Yeats, 216 Ala. 434, 113 So. 299 (1927) ; Hannon
v. Seigel-Cooper Co., 167 N. Y. 244, 60 N. E. 597 (1901) (A leading case);
Fields, Inc. v. Evans, 36 Ohio App. 153, 172 N. E. 702 (1929) commented upon
(1931) 11 B. U. L. REv. 85, (1931) 29 Micn. L. REv. 640; Christiansen v.
Fantle Bros., Inc. et. al., 56 S. D. 350, 228 N. W. 407 (1929). AGENCy RE-
STATEMENT (Am. L. Inst., 1930) §490.
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than the facts would warrant. It does not appear that the plaintiff
relied on any representations which might have been made by him,"1
nor does it appear that he made any representations, other than the
registration of the cab in his name.
If a corporation is chartered for the purpose of owning and oper-
ating taxicabs, it would seem only just to say that, since this is a
business affected with a public interest, this responsibility could not
be avoided by renting their name to independent contractors ;12 but,
where no such authority is contained in the charter, it would not be
unreasonable to force the actual owners and operators of the cabs to
give bond or take out liability insurance as a condition precedent to
obtaining their licenses. This policy has been adopted by statute,1 8
with regard to taxicab and bus operators, in many states, and these
laws have been uniformly held to be constitutional, and not in viola-
tion of the "Due Process" clause.14 This whole situation presents a
rather elusive problem, and such requirements are, undoubtedly, the
most satisfactory solution. J. B. ADAms.
" Agusta Freidman's Shop v. Yeats, snpra note 9; cf. Denver & R. G. R.
Co. v. Gustafson, 21 Colo. 393, 41 P. 505 (1895) (Where the apparent agent
was the watchman at a grade crossing.).
'Jung v. New Orleans Ry. & Light Co., 145 La. 727, 82 So. 870 (1919);
Dressler v. McArdle, 85 Misc. Rep. 444, 147 N. Y. S. 821 (1914) ; MECHEM,
AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) §724.
'Dixie Stage Lines v. Anderson, 134 So. 23 (Ala., 1931); Robeson v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., supra note 5; King v. Brenham Automobile Co., 145 S.
W. 278, 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) ("Taking for granted the truth of the
statements of the officers of the company, we are of the opinion that a cor-
poration, chartered for certain purposes, cannot evade its responsibilities to the
general public by delegating its authority to others, whether responsible or
irresponsible. . . . No responsible person or corporation- could be held liable
for the most outrageous acts of negligence if they should be allowed to place
a 'middleman' between them and the public, and escape liability by the manner
in which they recompense their servants.").
" IDAHo CoDE ANN. (1932) §59-806; Na. Comp. STAT. (1929) §60-202;
N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws (Cahill, 1930), c. 64-a, §17; WASH. ComP. STAT. (Rem-
ington, 1931) §6382 et seq. The North Carolina statute, N. C. CoDE ANN.
(Michie, 1931) §2621 (112) et seq. applies to all automobile owners against
whom a judgment of $100 has been docketed and remains unsatisfied. Nichols
et al v. Maxwell, 202 N. C. 38, 161 S. E. 712 (1932).
4 Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257, 68 L. ed. 596 (1923).
In some jurisdictions it has been held that a municipal corporation has the
power to demand such bond or insurance under its general authority to reg-
ulate motor vehicles within its borders: Lutz v. City of New Orleans, 237 Fed.
1018 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917); Kruger v. California Indemnity Exch., 201 Cal.
672, 258 P. 602 (1927) ; Commonwealth v. Kelley, 229 Ky. 722, 17 S. W. (2d)
1017 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Slocum, 230 Mass. 180, 119 N. E. 687 (1919) ;
Jitney Bus Ass'n of Wilkes-Barre et al v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 256 Pa. 462,
100 A. 954 (1917) ; cf. Sprout v. City of South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, 48 Sup.
Ct. 502, 72 L. ed. 833 (1928); West et al v. Sun Cab Co., Inc., 154 A. 100
(Md., 1931).
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Banks and Banking-Collection Items as Preferences.
Plaintiff drew a sight draft on C. The collecting bank accepted as
payment a check from C, a depositor, on itself, and then forwarded
to plaintiff its owA draft on a St. Louis bank. Payment of the draft
was refused because of the collecting bank's subsequent insolvency.
Held, plaintiff had no preferred claim against the collecting bank,'
although plaintiff had stipulated that the proceeds of the draft were
to be treated as a trust2 fund.8 The court declared that such stipula-
tion did not contemplate that the collecting bank should hold the
proceeds as a bailment and remit the specific funds collected; hence,
on collection, a debtor-creditor relationship superseded the agency
relationship of plaintiff and the collecting bank.4 Further, since the
assets of the bank were not augmented, there were no funds to which
a trust aspect could attach.
The possible efficacy of any stipulation attempting to impress a
trust on the proceeds of a collection item seems to depend on the
individual court's reasons for denying trusts in such proceeds gen-
erally. Trusts5 'have been held to exist on the grounds of an in-
tended agency relationship if the owner of the item is not a general
Allied Mills v. Horton, 65 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933).
'In this comment, and for that matter, in most cases in which it is sought
to establish a preferred claim in re proceeds of a collection item, the word
"trust" is used, although a "trust" in the usual sense of the word almost never
exists. "Trust" under these circumstances is a label attached after the court
has decided a preferred claim should exist rather than a means of determining
whether a preference should be allowed. Thus "trust" as used in this comment
merely means "grounds for a preferred claim." TowNsEND, Insolvent Banks
and Collection Preferences: The Heaven of Psychophoros Revisited (1932) 6
TULANE L. R. 643.
'The specific statement is: "This draft a cash item and not to be treated as
a deposit. The funds obtained through its collection are to be accounted for to
us and are not to be commingled with the other funds of the collecting bank."
' When the collecting bank remits by a draft on a third bank and such draft
is refused payment because of the collecting bank's insolvency, some courts
have held that the draft constitutes an equitable assignment of funds received
in trust. Hence collection may be enforced against the third bank on the theory
of a constructive trust. Carson Nat. Bank v. American Nat. Bank, 225 Io.
App. 64, 34 S. W. (2d) 143 (1930); Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens,
108 W. Va. 12, 150 S. E. 137 (1929).
'Only illustrative cases are cited below. For a collection and discussion of
cases upholding and cases denying the existence of a trust in the proceeds of a
collection item Townsend, Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections (1930) 39
YLr L. J. 980; (1896) 32 L. R. A. 715; (1912) 38 L. R, A. (N. S.) 146; (1917)
L. R. A. (1917F) 603; (1923) 24 A. L. R. 1152; (1926) 42 A. L. R. 754;
(1927) 47 A. L. R. 761; (1931) 73 A. L. R. 71; (1932) 77 A. L. R. 473.
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depositor,6 if the owner instructs the bank "to collect only,"7 "to
collect and notify,"8 "to collect and remit,"9 to treat as a trust ;1o
statutory regulations impose a trust in some jurisdictions." The
existence of a trust has been denied on the grounds that a debtor-
creditor relationship arises after collection by virtue of an express
agreement, 12 or because customary,18 or because the stipulation of
the owner fails in fact to change the collecting bank's method of
handling the proceeds, 14 and on the grounds that the bank's assets
6 Piano M'f'g. Co. v. Auld, 14 S. D. 512, 86 N. W. 21 (1901) ; Skinner v.
Porter. 45 Idaho 530, 263 Pac. 993, (1928) (In the absence of reciprocal
accounts, the only duty of the collecting bank is to remit; hence a trust in the
proceeds of the collection item).
7 State v. Bank of Commerce, 61 Neb. 181, 85 N. W. 43 (1901).
8 Guignon v. First Nat. Bank, 22 Mont. 140, 55 Pac. 1051 (1899).
'Hall v. Beymer, 22 Colo. App. 271, 125 Pac. 561 (1912); Federal Reserve
Bank v. Millspaugh, 275 S. W. 583 (Mo. App. 1926) (no reciprocal accounts);
Vermont Loan and Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 37 Wyo. 216, 260 Pac. 534
(1927).
"That is, a more detailed and explicit stipulation than a mere "for col-
lection and remittance" is attached to the draft. First Nat. Bank of Raton v.
Dennis, 20 N. M. 96, 146, Pac. 948 (1915); Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. New
State Bank, 124 Okla. 185, 256 Pac. 43 (1926) (same stipulation as in prin-
cipal case, supra note 3) ; cf. Peters Shoe Co. v. Murray, infra note 20.
1 OHIo CODE (Throckmorton, 1929) §713 applied in Fulton v. R. Baker-
Toledo Co., 125 Ohio St. 518, 182 N. E. 513 (1932) ; S. C. CODE ANI. (Michie,
1932) §6960 held to be constitutional in Witt v. People's State Bank of S. C.,
166 S. C. 1, 164 S. E. 309 (1932). Preferred claims would probably be
allowed in the following states by virtue of statutes: IND. Acrs (1929) c. 164
§13; MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, Supp. 1929) art. 11 §95: N. Y. CoNsoL LAws
(Cahill, 1930) c. 39 §350-1; WAsH. Rav. STAT. (Remington, 1932) §§3292-13;
Wis. STAT. (1931) §§220-15.
'Commonwealth v. State Bank of Pittsburg, 216 Pa. 124, 64 At. 923
(1906).
"This view is that while the collecting bank is the agent of the owner of the
collection item until proceeds are collected, yet-inasmuch as the bank mingles
the proceeds with its own funds as soon as collection is made and sends the
owner a cashier's check or its own draft-the agency relationship ceases on col-
lection and that of debtor and creditor arises. Hecker-Jones-Jewel Mill. Co.
v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333, (1922) ; Gordon v.
Rasines, 5 Misc. 192, 25 N. Y. S. 767 (1893). This is held to be true even
when the owner is not a depositor in, or has no reciprocal accounts with, the
collecting bank for the reason that, as a matter of banking practice, the col-
lecting bank does substitute an obligation of its own for the amount of the
proceeds of the collection item rather than remit the specific funds collected,
infra note 14.
" The stipulation is made not in contemplation of any actual change in
banking practices or methods, but solely with a view to obtaining a preference
in the event of the collecting bank's insolvency. Lippitt v. Thames Loan and
Trust Co., 38 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369 (1914); Union Nat. Bank v. Citizens
Bank, 153 Ind. 44, 54 N. E. 970 (1899) ("There was nothing in the transac-
tion . .. which indicated that other than the usual course of dealing was ex-
pected by the forwarding bank.") Leach v. Farmers and Merchants Savings
Bank, 207 Iowa 471, 220 N. W. 10 (1928).
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are not augmented, 15 or that, because of mingling, it is impossible to
trace the funds.'8
Therefore, if a forwarding bank wishes to have a preferred claim
in the event of the collecting bank's insolvency, clearly a statement
that only cash was to be collected, and remitted in specie, would cer-
tainly be effective,17 but such a method of remittance is obviously
impractical. A use of such stipulation with the tacit understanding
that it was only a safeguard, to be disregarded in practice, would
probably be held to have no effect.' 8 Some state courts which re-
gard the intention of the parties as controlling, and which ordinarily
deny a preference, would probably permit even such a stipulation' 0
as in the principal case to constitute grounds for allowing a prefer-
ence.20  A statement accompanying the draft requiring segregation
of the general funds of the bank, to the amount of the item, might by
some state courts be held to be sufficient to entitle the forwarding
bank to a preferred claim. 21 But it is doubtful if such language
5Midland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994 (1898);
Com. v. State Bank, 216 Pa. 124, 64 Atl. 923 (1906); Harnish, Moore and
Porterfield v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 56 S. D. 18, 227 N. W. 375
(1929). This has been the principal reason assigned in a long line of federal
decisions for refusing to concede a trust. Amer. Can Co. v. Williams, 178
Fed. 420 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910). Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. First Nat. Bank,
13 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) (Federal cases supporting this view cited
therein by circuits); (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 682. Cases holding the opposite
view meet the argument that there has been no augmentation of assets by
declaring that it would be a useless procedure to cash the check and then
return the cash, and that therefore payment by check is the same in its
legal effect as payment in cash, Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. New State Bank,
upra note 10; or by holding that in as much as a successful remittance of the
proceeds would have decreased the assets of the bank, a retention of these
proceeds, therefore, augmented its assets. Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne,
69 Mont. 140, 220 Pac. 1114 (1923).
11 State ex rel. N. C. Corp. Com. v. Merchants and Farmers Bank, 137 N. C.
697, 50 S. E. 308 (1905).
' Union Nat. Bank v. Citizens Bank, supra note 14; Hallam v. Tillinghast,
19 Wash. 20, 52 Pac. 329 (1898).
1 Stipulations are ineffective if the parties do not in fact contemplate a
change in the bank's method of handling such items, supra note 14. Clearly,
however, the party stipulating collection in cash does intend just that, in as
much as the legal effect of collection in cash would be to impress a trust on
such funds since the bank's assets are augmented. But the federal courts
ignore this.
" Supra note 3.
' Peters Shoe Co. v. Murray, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 259, at 260, 71 S. W. 977,
at 978 (1903).
Hallam v. Tillinghast, mtpra note 17 (suggests such would be effective).
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-would be regarded by the Federal Courts as having any effect, in as
:nuch as such procedure would hamper banking relations.
22
V HARRY W. MCGALLIARD.
I)amages-Unauthorized Disclosure of Telegram as Basis
,of Punitive Damages.
The plaintiff sued for the wrongful disclosure of the contents of
a telegram from his divorced wife. The disclosure was made to the
-plaintiff's fiance by one of the defendant's employees who had
-erroneously concluded from the message that the plaintiff was still
married. Although the fiancee then knew of the previous marriage
and divorce, she immediately broke off the engagement. The plain-
tiff's recovery was limited to nominal damages. Held, a corporate
employer is not liable for punitive damages without having par-
ticipated in or ratified his servant's act.'
In actions ex delicto where the tortious conduct was character-
ized by malice or wantonness, exemplary damages are discretionary
with the jury.2 As in the principal case, the wantonness may take
the form of a reckless disregard for another's rights.3 Verdicts in
,excess of the plaintiff's actual loss are the exception rather than the
rUle.
4
Concerning the liability of employers for exemplary damages, in
most jurisdictions the practice prevails of limiting an individual em-
ployer's liability to those acts of his servant in which he has himself
participated.5 Judicial opinion is rather evenly divided on the ques-
tion of the liability of corporate -employers.6 The federal courts and
' Allied Mill v. Horton, supra note 1, at 710. The court states with ref-
•erence to the stipulation accompanying the draft, supra note 3: "If each time
-such a draft is collected the collecting. bank under such notice is required to
.place the specific funds received in a safe deposit box or in a package for the
drawer, the transaction of business through drafts . . . would be quite
revolutionized."
'Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Aldridge, 66 F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 9th,
1933).
'Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 13
Sup. Ct. 261, 37 L. ed. 97 (1893). Contra: Boott Mills Co. v. Boston & Maine
R. Co., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N. E. 680 (1914) (Louisiana, Nevada, and Washing-
-ton follow Massachusetts in rejecting the doctrine of exemplary damages com-
pletely).
'Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519, 6
Atl. 545 (1886).
' Cock v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 84 Miss. 380, 36 So. 392 (1904).
'Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481, 14 Atl. 488 (1888).
McCormick, The Doctrine of Exemplary Damages (1930) 8 N. C. L. Rv.
129, 132.
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many states have extended to corporations the treatment accorded
individual employers.7 A great number of jurisdictions, however,
adhere to the contrary rule of unrestricted liability by which, if an
employee's wrongful act is such as to render him liable for exem-
plary damages and his corporate employer for compensatory dam-
ages, the latter may be held for the exemplary damages as well.8 The
adherents of this rule hold that, because of the pecuniary irresponsi-
bility of employees who are placed in positions of trust for the benefit
of the corporations, unrestricted liability is a social necessity which
justifies the lenient interpretation of the requirement of malice as a
basis for the recovery of punitive damages.0
In the federal courts, where the question of exemplary damages is
considered a matter of general jurisprudence and decided in accord-
ance with the federal rule,' 0 to recover such damages the plaintiff
must show that the corporate employer was privy to the misconduct. 11
This connection may be established by proof of specific or general
authorization,' 2 actual participation through a company executive,18
employment or retention of an employee of known incompetence or
recklessness,' 4 or subsequent ratification of the wrong.15
An addressee may sue a telegraph company in tort for a breach
of its public duty, such as an unauthorized disclosure. 16 Thus, the
nominal award of $1 compensatory damages in the principal case
does not appear to represent fully the plaintiff's actual injury. It is
true that he cannot 'recover for the loss of the engagement. The in-
terest of the parties to a marriage engagement is not protected against
its rupture by third persons,' 7 regardless of the aggravated nature of
the circumstances.' 8 In addition, the fianc&ees admission of prior
" Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, supra note 2;
Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689, 120 Pac. 771 (1911); Marlatt v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 167 Wis. 176, 167 N. W. 263 (1918).
'Goddard v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 57 Me. 202 (1869); Peterson v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 75 Minn. 368, 77 N. W. 985 (1899).
'Peterson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., supra note 8.
"Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co. v. Prentice, supra note 2.
"Ibid.
' Denver & Rio Grande R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct. 1286, 30
L. ed. 1146 (1887).
3Ibid.
" Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central & Hudson River R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44, 15 Am.
Rep. 375 (1874).
"Forrester v. Southern Pacific Co., 36 Nev. 247, 134 Pac. 753 (1913).
"Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Cowin & Co., 20 F. (2d) 103 (C. C. A.
8th, 1927).
"Homan v. Hall, 102 Neb. 70, 165 N. W. 881 (1917).
'Davis v. Condit, 124 Minn. 365, 144 N. W. 1089 (1915) (plaintiff's fianc~e
seduced).
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knowledge of the plaintiff's first marriage tends to show that the
breach did not result proximately from the disclosure. But the dis-
closure itself was a clear invasion of the plaintiff's right of privacy
in his communications with others.19 In an analogous class of cases
dealing with the tapping of telephone wires, substantial compensatory
damages are recoverable, even where there is no injurious use of the
information obtained. 2° If the right of privacy in communications
is to receive the protection which its importance to the individual
merits, it would seem that the courts should assess substantial dam-
ages upon those who violate it.
ERVID ERIC ERICSON.
Declaratory Judgments-Recent Trends.
Plaintiff sued in the New York state courts for an injunction to
restrain the sale of reclassified stock of defendant corporation and
for a declaratory judgment as to the rights of preferred stockholders
under the Delaware reclassification statute. The cause was removed
to the Federal District Court in New York, the injunction denied,
and the complaint dismissed without prejudice to any rights plaintiff
might have in the matter. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the denial of an injunction, but held it was error to dismiss
the application for a declaratory judgment.1
In three leading cases, 2 the Supreme Court of the United States
uttered dicta, criticized as unwarranted and inappropriate,3 to the
effect that the requirements of a case or controversy under Article
III of thd Constitution prevented declaratory judgments in the Fed-
eral Courts, originally or by removal. These dicta were followed in
subsequent cases. 4 Recently, by a unanimous opinion in Nashville,
Green, The Right of Privacy (1932) 27 ILL. L. Ray. 237, 252.
'Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931) commented
on (1932) 11 Oma. L. Rav. 217.
1Harr et. al. v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., 65 F. (2d) 332 (C. C. A. 2d,
1933).
'Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 47 Sup. Ct. 282, 71 L. ed.
541 (1927); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op. Ass'n.,
276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291, 72 L. ed. 473 (1928); Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n., 277 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 507, 72 L. ed. 880 (1928).
'Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment (1928) 14
A. B. A. J. 633, 635.
'State of Arizona v. State of California, 283 U. S. 423, 51 Sup. Ct. 522, 75
L. ed. 1154 (1931) ; Lamoreaux v. Kinney, 41 F. (2d) 30 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) ;
Marty v. Nagle, 44 F. (2d) 695 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) ; City of Osceola, Iowa v.
Utilities Holding Corp., 55 F. (2d) 155 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Chicago Bank
of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 F. (2d) 393 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932.)
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C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace,5 the Court seemingly reversed itself
and to some extent opened the Federal Courts for declaratory judg-
ments. In that case, on appeal from the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee, a declaratory judgment under the Tennessee Declaratory
Judgment Act was held entitled to review in the Supreme Court as
of right under Section 237a of the Judicial Code.
The principal case is the first reported application for a declar-
atory judgment in the Federal Courts since the Nashville case. In
the latter, a declaratory judgment was used for a situation tradition-
ally handled by injunction. This may imply a limitation upon the
scope of declaratory judgments in the Federal Courts. The case
under discussion, however, seems free from this limitation, for here
the Circuit Court of Appeals held a declaratory judgment available
notwithstanding its approval of the order denying an injunction.
On the question of removal the Court said in Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Ass'n that an application for a declaratory judgment
should have been remanded to the state courts for failure to present
a case or controversy under Article III. In the principal case, also a
removal case, the Court apparently takes a different view, 7 unless the
last sentence quoted in the note from the opinion qualifies its position.
If that qualification is effective, must some more traditional type of
procedure be invoked to gain standing in the Federal Courts in order
to secure, as an adjunct thereto, a declaratory judgment?
Five cases have come before the Supreme Court of North Car-
olina since the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act s was enacted in
1931. In three of these cases the declaratory judgment was denied.
'Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53
Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed. 444 (1933). (Plaintiff sued in courts of Tennessee for
a declaratory judgment to the effect that a state excise tax 'was, as applied to
him, unconstitutional. The Supreme Court of Tennessee held the tax valid,
and plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States) commented
upon (1932) 42 YAI.n L. J. 974, (1932) 46 HARv. L. R. 850.
' Supra note 2.
" Harr et al. v. Pioneer Mechanical Corp., supra note 1, at 335 ("The name
given the relief sought is of no particular moment. The controversy is clearly
adverse and over matters 'which are justiceable in a District court when there
is a diversity of citizenship and the requisite amount is involved. We think
Nashville, Chattanooga, and St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace is authority for deciding
the case fully on the merits. An added reason is found in that, where equitable
jurisdiction has been properly invoked in an adversary suit for the purpose of
seeking an injunction, the court may dispose of the entire controversy between
the parties to the action").
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §628. See Van Hecke, The North Caro-
lina Declaratory Judgment Act (1931) 10 N. C. L. R. 1, for valuable discussion
of the procedure, uses and advantages of declaratory judgments.
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In the other two it was granted. This does not mean that the Act has
not been given liberal interpretation or that the potentialities of the
procedure as an alternative remedy9 have been overlooked. The
denials were based on plaintiff's failure to present an adversary dis-
pute on a question of legal import in connection with his application
for a declaratory judgment to settle his racial status ;1o on the belief
that probate under provisions of Section 4163 of the consolidated
statutes ought still to be the exclusive procedure to determine the
validity of a will ;" and on the fact that plaintiff's complaint stated
a cause of action which had already accrued under an insurance pol-
icy, and not a prayer for anticipatory relief. 12 The two instances in
which the Court upheld declaratory judgments illustrate the value
of the new remedy. In one a deed was construed in advance of any
breach of covenants and the rights of the parties set forth.18 In the
other, a recent and most important case, the Court determined the
rights of the city, the traction company, and the public under a street-
car franchise from the city of Raleigh. 14
JOE EAGLES.
Evidence-Trial Judge's Power of Comment.
In Quercia v. United States' the court charged the jury that
defendant had wiped his hands during his testimony and that such a
mannerism was almost always an indication of lying, and further,
that he thought everything the defendant said was a lie. Held:
Prejudical error.
Under the common law, trial judges had the power of comment-
ing and expressing their opinion upon the evidence.2 This rule is
still followed in English courts3 and in the federal courts of the
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §628 ("Courts of record within their
-respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed").
. In Re George C. Eubanks, 202 N. C. 357, 162 S. E. 769 (1932). See
Miller v. Currie, 242 N. W. 570 (Wis. 1932) (a declaratory judgment as to
plaintiff's legitimacy is possible under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act.) Commented upon (1932) 46 HAR. L. REv. 336.
' Poore v. Poore, 201 N. C. 791, 161 S. E. 532 (1931).
" Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. of Cincinnati, 203 N. C. 767, 167 S. .
38 (1932).
'Walker v. Phelps, 202 N. C. 344, 162 S. E. 727 (1932)."' Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Isley, 203 N. C. 811, 167 S. E. 56 (1933).
177 L. ed. 996 (1933).
'Capitol Traction Co. v. Hoff, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580, 43 L. ed. 873
(1899) ; HALE, HisTORy OF THE. CoMmox LAW (1792) 291; 16 C. J. 939 §2308b.
"Jefferson v. Paskell, 1 K. B. 57 (1916).
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United States, in both dvil and criminal cases.4  This, honever, is
not an unrestricted power of comment. It is subject to the general,
flexible limitation typically defined as follows: "the line of demarca-
tion between what a court may say to the jury * ** * * in expressing
his opinion on the facts, and what he may not say, is to be drawn
between mere expression of opinion not partaking of such argu-
mentative nature as to amount to advocacy, leaving to the jury abso-
lute freedom to determine the facts; and such discussion as amounts
to an argument and makes the court in fact an advocate against the
defendant." 5 This vague rule permits of widely divergent results.0
For example, in a criminal case the court's charge that "in my opin-
ion the defendant is a liar" was held to be prejudical. 7 On the other
hand a charge that the government's witnesses, who had directly
contradicted the defendant, "were telling the truth" was held not to
exceed the power of comment.8 In practically all cases, the trial
judge's comment is held not to be prejudicial if the judge qualifies his
remarks by making it clear to the jury that what he says is not bind-
ing upon them and that the facts are subject to their consideration
and decision,9 unless -his comment is obviously unfair and argu-
mentative, 10 such as "you are not to be hoodwinked or bamboozled
by anybody * * * if a witness testifies that down the street he saw
an elephant climb a telephone pole, you are not bound to believe it is
a fact, even though he shows you the pole."1" Under the above rule,
"Simmons v. United States, 142 U. S. 148, 12 Sup. Ct. 171, 35 L. ed. 968
(1891Y; United States v. Phila., Reading R. Co., 123 U. S. 113, 8 Sup. Ct. 77,
31 L. ed. 138 (1887); CooLEY, PRINCIPLES OP CONSTITunONAL LAW (3d ed.
1898) 265.
'Cook v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) ; Kolknman v.
People, 89 Colo. 8, 300 Pac. 575, 579 (1931).
"Hicks v. United States, 150 U. S. 442, 14 Sup. Ct. 144, 37 L. ed. 1137
(1893); Allison v. United States, 160 U. S. 203, 16 Sup. Ct. 252, 40 L. ed. 395
(1895); cf. Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 36, 65
L. ed. 185 (1920) ; Shea v. United States, 251 Fed. 440 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
' Malaga v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. 1st, 1932).
'Tuckermann v. United States, 291 Fed. 958 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
'Buchanan v. United States, 15 F. (2d) 496 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) ; Weider-
man v. United States, 10 F. (2d) 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Tuckermann v.
United States, supra note 8, at 965.
"Starr v. United States, 153 U. S. 614, 626, 14 Sup. Ct. 919, 38 L. ed. 841
(1894) (trial judge voiced his indignation in a sarcastic charge ridiculing the
defense) ; Mullen v. United States, 106 Fed. 892 (C. C. A. 6th, 1901) (the court
charged "that if these defendants desired or anybody desired to have colored
men deprived of the right to vote, it would be in such a precinct as this and
it is not improbable that just such men as these defendants would be chosen
to carry that object into execution") ; Parker v. United States, 2 F. (2d) 710
(C. C. A. 6th, 1924).
Carney v. United States, 295 Fed. 606 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924).
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comment is allowed only upon the evidence in the case12 and it should
be given so as not to mislead the jury in ultimately deciding con-
troverted questions of fact.' 8
The trends, if any, in respect to the use of the above rule seem
to be: (1) that greater emphasis is allowed in the federal courts in
commenting on the evidence;14 and (2) that some distinction is
drawn in a few jurisdictions between the application of the rule in
criminal and in civil cases, some states limiting the extent of com-
ment in criminal cases.15 Federal courts, however, as regards the
comment rule, are not bound by the practice in the jurisdictions in
which they are sitting.'1
Although only twelve states follow the practice of the English
and federal courts,17 it would seem that such is the better policy
since it does not deprive the jury of the experience and knowledge
of the trial judge. Those who oppose this policy on the ground that
he will usurp the jury's function have little to fear in view of the
'Mullen v. United States, supra note 10, at 895; O'Shaughnessy et al. v.
United Stales, 17 F. (2d) 225 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); City of Minneapolis v.
Canterbury, 122 Minn. 301, 142 N. W. 812 (1913).
"Rudd v. United States, 173 Fed. 912, 97 C. C. A. 462 (1909) ; State v.
Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 Pac. 987 (1908) ; Seviour v. Rutland R. Co., 88 Vt.
107, 91 Atl. 1039 (1914).
" United States v. Phila., Reading R. Co., supra note 4, at 139; Weiderman
v. United States, supra note 9, at 746; cf. State v. Greene, supra note 13, at
989; Bradley v. Gorham, 77 Conn. 211, 58 Atl. 698 (1904).
People v. Lee, 2 Utah 441 (1878) ; State .v. Dolliver, 150 Minn. 155, 184
N. W. 848 (1921); Ames v. Cannon River Co., 27 Minn. 245, 6 N . W. 787
(1880).
' Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U. S. 426, 23 L. ed. 286 (1875) (The supreme court
in commenting upon the act of Congress, June 1, 1872 (17 Stat. 197 (1872), 28
U. S. C. A. 724 (1928)) -which states that the practice of the circuit and district
courts shall conform to that of the state courts in which such circuit or dis-
trict court is held, says-"The identity reqt.ired is to be in practice, pleadings
and forms and modes of proceeding. The personal conduct and administration
of the judge in the discharge of his separate functions is in our judgment,
neither practice, pleading, nor a form nor mode of proceeding within the
meaning of those terms as found in the context.")
' Colorado-Kolkman v. People, supra note 5.
Connecticut-State v. Cianeflone, 98 Conn. 454, 120 Atl. 349 (1923).
Michigan-People v. Burlingame, 257 Mich. 252, 241 N. W. 253 (1932);
MicH. ComP. LAWS (1929) §17322.
Minnesota-Ames v. Cannon River Co., supra note 15.
New Hampshire-Flanders v. Colby, 28 N. H. 34 (1853).
New Jersey-Merklinger v. Lambert, 76 N. J. L. 806, 72 At. 119 (1909).
New York-Hurlbutt v. Hurlbutt, 128 N. Y. 420, 28 N. E. 651 (1891).
Ohio-Sandoffsky v. State, 29 Ohio App. 419, 163 N. E. 634 (1928).
Pennsylvania-Johnston v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St. 54 (1877).
Rhode Island-Smith v. Rhode Island Co.. 39 R. I. 146, 98 Atl. 1 (1916).
Utah-People v. Lee, supra note 15.
Vermont-Sawyer v. Phaley, 33 Vt. 69 (1860).
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tendency on the part of appellate courts to rigidly supervise hi.
exercise of discretion.' 8
E. D. KUYKENDALL, JR.
Insurance-Construction of "Violation of Law"
Exception in Policy.
An action was brought on a life insurance policy which provided
that double indemnity should not be payable if death resulted from
violation of law. Insured was killed when he ran 'his car into a cul-
vert on the left side of the highway. The court below instructed the
jury that if insured "inadvertently and involuntarily drove his car
upon the left hand side of the road, 'he may have been guilty of
negligence, but he was not guilty of violation of law in so doing."
Held, that this instruction was erroneous.'
Some courts in construing such conditions have held that there
must be a violation of the criminal law.2  Generally, this clause in-
cludes the commission of a misdemeanor,3 but where the associated
exceptions impute the commission of a felony, the courts hold, in
accordance with the maxim noscitur a sociis, that the exception ex-
tends only to a violation of law which amounts to a felony.4 The
resulting death may be accidental 5 or caused by the intentional act of
another.0 However, in order that the insurer may be discharged the
' Hickory v. United States, 160 U. S. 408, 16 Sup. Ct. 327, 40 L. ed. 474, 480
(1896) and cases cited.
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Grimsley, 168 S. E. 329 (Va. 1933).
'Ragan v. Provident Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 209 Iowa 1075, 229 N. W. 702
(1930) (riding in box car held no crime such as to avoid accident policy) ; see
Cluff v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 13 Allen (Mass.) 308, 317 (1866) (attempt-
ing to forcefully take 'personal property from debtor).
Some courts say it need not necessarily be a violation of the criminal law.
Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478. 49 Am. Rep. 469 (1884). In
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall. 531, 22 L. ed. 155 (1873) where insured
was killed in horse race, the court said, "It was against the general species of
danger attending nearly all infractions of law that the exception was directed."
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, supra note 2 (horse-racing made a mis-
demeanor); Wolff v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 5 Mo. App, 236 (1878).
Coara: Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Quarles, 23 Ga. App. 104, 97
S. E. 557 (1918)."
"Harper's Adm'r v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 19 Mo. 506 (1854) ("if insured
should die in consequence of a duel, or by the hands of justice, or in the known
violation of any law of this state") ; cf. Brown v. Supreme Lodge K. P., 83
Mo. App. 633 (1900) (all the associated exceptions were not felonies).
Murray v. New York Life Ins. Co., 96 N. Y. 614, 48 Am. Rep. 658 (1884).
0 Osborne v. People's Benev. Industrial Life Ins. Co. of La., 19 La. App.
667, 139 So. 733 (1932).
In some cases the test has been whether the insured was the aggressor.
Woodmen of the World v. Walters, 124 Ky. 663, 99 S. W. 930 (1907) ; Payne
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violation of law by the insured must be the proximate,7 though not
the sole,8 cause of the death or injury. The violation of law must be
voluntary, and therefore, where the insured is insane the insurer is
not discharged,9 but the exemption from liability is not affected by
the fact that insured was intoxicated at the time of the violation
of law.' 0
The conduct of the insured has been held to be a violation of law
within such exceptions where the insured: assaulted one who shot
him ;11 unlawfully pointed a gun at another ;12 committed an assault
and battery on wife of man who shot him ;13 was violating Sunday
laws ;14 was placing trot-line to prevent free passage of fish ;15 was
trying to get on moving car in violation of statute ;16 was alighting
from moving train likewise prohibited;17 submitted to an abortion
v. Union Life Guards, 136 Mich. 416, 99 N. W. 376 (1904). Others declare
that if the killing was, justifiable, the insurer is not responsible. Railway Mail
Assoc. v. Moseley, 211 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1914); Am. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
White, 126 Ark. 483, 191 S. W. 25 (1916). Others say the killing, need not be
justifiable. -Hobbs v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 212 Ala. 467, 102 So. 625
(1925). Where the action on the policy is defended on the theory that the
member was killed by another in self-defense, evidence of the third person's
indictment, trial, and acquittal is inadmissible. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v.
McDonald, 109 Miss. 167, 68 So. 74 (1915).
"Supreme Lodge v. Beck, 181 U. S. 49, 21 Sup. Ct. 532, 45 L. ed. 741
(1901); Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' Assoc. 186 Iowa 454, 172
N. W. 454 (1919).
'Whyte v. Union Mut. Casualty Co., 209 Iowa 917, 227 N. W. 518 (1929).
9 Howle v. Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen, 118 Ark. 226, 176
S. W. 313 (1915); Woodmen of the World v. Dodd, 134 S. W. 254 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1911).
However, a provision that the policy shall be void if death occurs in con-
sequence of a violation of law, whether the insured is sane or insane, is valid.
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. v. Hunt, 136 Miss. 156, 98 So. 62 (1923).
"Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Howle, 124 Ark. 224, 187
S. W. 176 (1916) ; Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 97 Ind. 478, 49 Am. Rep.
469 (1884).
'Osborne v. People's Benev. Industrial Life Ins. Co. of La., 19 La. App.
667, 139 So. 733 (1932); Hobbs v. Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W. 212 Ala. 467,
102 So. 625 (1925).
"North Carolina Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 38 Ga. App. 178, 143 S. E.
449 (1928).
' Bloom v. Franklin Life Ins. Co. 97 Ind. 478, 49 Am. Rep. 469 (1884).
"Duran v. Standard Life & Ace. Ins. Co. 63 Vt. 437, 22 Atl. 530 (1891);
cf. Eaton v. Atlas Ace. Ins. Co., 89 Me. 570, 36 Atl. 1048 (1897) (insurer
liable where insured was injured while riding bicycle from funeral on Sunday).
' See Collins v. Bankers' Ace. Ins. Co., 96 Iowa 216, 64. N. W. 778, 779
(1895).
"Flower v. Continental Casualty Co., 140 Iowa 510, 118 N. W. 761 (1908).
'Poole v. Imperial Mut. Life & Health Ins. Co., 188 N. C. 468, 125 S. E.
8 (1924) (question for jury whether there was a known violation of law).
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which was not a medical necessity;18 was gambling;19 was partic-
ipating in horse race;20 was driving car at an unlawful rate of
speed ;21 was transporting liquor;22 was driving while intoxicated ;23
was attempting to escape with money after committing robbery.
24
On the other hand, the liability of insurer was not discharged
where the insured: ran his car on sidewalk and into pillar on left-
hand side of the street;25 cursed and abused another but was shot
before he committed any act ;26 shot himself while carrying pistol on
highway ;27 drove a motorcycle which was not licensed and registered
according to law ;28 committed suicide ;29 rode on running board of a
truck in violation of an ordinance ;30 committed abortion upon her-
self ;81 swung from moving car ;32 rode in box car ;83 drank "bootleg"
whiskey served by his host ;34 attempted sexual intercourse with an-
'Wells v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, 191 Pa. St. 207, 43
At. 126 (1899).
"Landry v. Independent Nat. Life Ins. Co., 17 La. App. 10, 135 So. 110
(1931).
"Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Seaver, 19 Wall. 531, 22 L. ed. 155 (1873).
'Rowe v. United Commercial Travelers' Ass'n, 186 Iowa 454, 172 N. W.
454 (1919) ; Witt v. Spot Cash Ins. Co., 128 Kan. 155, 276 Pac. 804 (1929) ; see
Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 308, 299 Pac. 831, 835 (1931).
'Flath v. Bankers' Casualty Co., 49 N. D. 1053, 194 N. W. 739 (1923).
Flanagan v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 22 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 4th,
1927).
"Haley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 189 Ill. 317, 59 N. E. 545 (1901). Contra:
Jordan v. Logie Suprema De La Alianza Hispano-Americana, 23 Ariz. 584,
206 Pac. 162 (1922) ; ten Hur Life Assoc. v. Cox, 181 N. E. 528 (Ind. App.
1932) commented upon (1932-33) 31 MicH. L. Rnv. 856; Griffin v. Western
Ass'n, 20 Neb. 620, 31 N. W. 122 (1886).
' Zohner v. Sierra Nevada Life & Casualty Co., 114 Cal. App. 85, 299 Pac.
749 (1931).
"Eminent Household of Columbian Woodmen v. Gallant, 194 Ala. 680, 69
So. 884 (1915) ; Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Einstein, 12 Ga. App. 380, 77 S. E.
209 (1913).
'Woodmen of the World v. Wright, 7 Ala. App. 255, 60 So. 1006 (1913).
'Fischer v. Midland Casualty Co., 189 Ill. App. 486 (1915).
"Kerr v. Minn. Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 39 Minn. 174, 39 N. W. 312 (1888)
(suicide to avoid arrest); Darrow v. Family Fund Soc., 116 N. Y. 537, 22
N. E. 1093 (1889) ; cf. Shipman v. Protected Home Circle, 174 N. Y. 398, 67
N. E. 83 (1903).
Reynolds v. Life & Casualty Ins. Co. of Tenn., 166 S. C. 214, 164 S. E.
602 (1932).
'Simmons v. Victory Industrial Life Ins. Co. of La., 18 La. App. 660, 139
So. 68 (1932).
" Nat. Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Lokey, 166 Ala. 174, 52 So. 45 (1910). (The
ordinance invoked, however, prohibited merely getting on while car moving.)
' Ragan v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 209 Iowa 1075, 229 N. W. 702
(1930).
3'Zurich Gen'l Acc. & Liability Ins. Co. v. Flickinger, 33 F. (2d) 853
(C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
other's wife,35 was living in a state of fornication with his mis-
tress;8e was assaulted without provocation after first combat had
ceased.3 7
In Zohner v. Sierra Nevada Life & Casualty Co.,38 where insured
was killed when he drove his car against a pillar on the sidewalk on
the left side of the street, recovery was allowed though the policy
excluded injuries sustained while violating law. The California
court said that the mere fact that a car is driven upon the left side
of the highway or across a sidewalk does not, under all circumstances,
constitute a violation of law. This seems to be a better resfilt than
that reached by the court in the principal case. The rule requiring
one to drive on the right side of the road applies ordinarily only when
one vehicle meets another5 9 What difference should it make in the
liability of the insurer whether the insured while driving along a
straight unobstructed highway happened to run off the left instead
of the right-hand side of the road?
JULE MCMICHAEL.
Judgments.-Effect of Personal Property Exemption.
By virtue of the North Carolina Constitution1 a resident debtor
is entitled to $500 personal property free from execution for the col-
lection of a debt, this exemption being subject to allotment upon
demand at any time before the process is executed by a sale.2
In a recent North Carolina cases the plaintiff held a valid judg-
ment against the defendant for $3,650. Execution had been returned
unsatisfied. Defendant was the owner of four life insurance policies
under whose health benefit clauses he was receiving $300 monthly.
Plaintiff, by supplemental proceedings, sought to reach this $300
monthly benefit and apply it on his judgment. The court held that
the defendant should be allowed to select the $300 each month as a
part of his $500 personal property exemption, so that at all times he
Supreme Lodge K. P. v. Crenshaw, 129 Ga. 195, 58 S. E. 628 (1907).
I Acc. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 90 Tenn. 256, 16 S. W. 723 (1891).
' Grose v. Liberty Industrial Ins. Co., 6 La. App. 390 (1927).
Supra note 25.
"Mike v. Levy, 210 App. Div. 813, 206 N. Y. Supp. 4 (1924) ; Weinstein
v. Wheeler, 135 Ore. 518, 295 Pac. 196 (1931); Segerstrom v. Lawrence, 64
Wash. 245, 116 Pac. 876 (1911); see Dole v. Lublin, 112 Conn. 603, 153 AUt.
856, 858 (1931) ; Reid v. McDevitt, 140 So. 722, 723 (Miss. 1932).
'Article X §1.
2 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §737.
1 Commissioner of Banks v. Yelverton, 204 N. C. 441, 168 S. E. 505 (1933).
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should have the amount of $500 which could not be reached by the
creditor. No matter how frequently creditors may bring execution
against the debtor he is entitled to ask for a reassignment of his per-
sonal property exemption at each different levy.4 Accordingly, if
between the first and second levies the debtor has consumed half of
his previous exemption he is entitled, upon the second levy, to re-
plenish the remainder by $250, bringing the total exemption back to
the $500 allowed. The creditor cannot avoid the exemption by hav-
ing the payments not yet due declared subject to the payment of his
debt.
5
If the plaintiff, in a proper case, had attempted to reach the prop-
erty of the defendant by attachment and garnishment instead of by
judgment and execution the result would have been the same. An
attachment is in the nature of a preliminary execution against the
property of the defendant which is subject to levy; and garnishment
is used to reach the debtor's property which is in the hands of a
third person and not subject to actual levy. A resident debtor can
claim his exemptions as against such proceeding.8
If the plaintiff, a resident creditor seeking to avoid the exemption
laws of this state, should proceed in the courts of another state by
attachment and garnishment against a non-resident debtor of a resi-
dent defendant, he may thus succeed in reaching property to be
applied to his debt;7 but since both plaintiff and defendant are in
such case residents of the state, the defendant may ask the court to
grant an injunction to restrain the creditor from proceeding in the
other state.8 If the plaintiff is a non-resident and should proceed by
garnishment against a debtor of the defendant in another state, the
IFrost v. Naylor, 68 N. C. 325 (1873) ; Shepherd v. Murrill, 90 N. C. 208
(1884) ; Pate v. Harper, 94 N. C. 23 (1886) ; Jones v. Alsbrook, 115 N. C. 46,
20 S. E. 170 (1894); Gardner v. McConnaughey, 157 N. C. 481, 73 S. E. 125
(1911); Befarrah v. Spell, 178 N. C. 231, 100 S. E. 321 (1919).
12 R. C. L. 800 ("By reason of the rule that the garnishing creditor can
reach no more than the garnishee owes the principal debtor.")
6 Gamble v. Rhyne, 80 N. C. 183 (1879); McINTosn, N. C. PcrlcE AND
PROCEDURE (1929) §§809 (3), 819.
Chicago, Rock Island & P. R. Co. v. Strum, 174 U. S. 710, 19 Sup. Ct.
797, 43 L. ed. 1144 (1899). ("It is held generally that exemption laws are a
part of the remedy of the forum and have no force beyond the bounds of the
state enacting them." Armour Fertilizer Works v. Sanders, 63 F. (2d) 902
(1933) ; Goodwin v. Claytor, 137 N. C. 224, 49 S. E. 173 (1904) ; Penn. R. Co.
v. Rogers, 52 W. Va. 450, 44 S. E. 300 (1903) ; McIntosh, op. cit. supra note 6
§758.
' Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1889);
Morton v. Hull, 77 Tex. 80, 13 S. W. 849 (1890); Wierse v. Thomas, 145
N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58 (1907).
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defendant would not be allowed to set up his personal property ex-
emption since it applies only within the state.9 Where a resident
debtor has brought action against his debtor and reduced his claim
to a judgment in this state, a non-resident creditor cannot reach the
amount due. on such judgment by attachment and garnishment in
another state.10 While this will protect the exemption of the debtor
in this state, the reason for such ruling is to preserve the control of
the court over the judgment rendered, since this would be interfered
with by the garnishment of the judgment debtor.
From this discussion the following conclusions may be drawn:
(1) The resident debtor's personal property exemption is afforded
complete protection from execution (a) where the creditor is a
resident of this state, and (b) where the creditor, although a non-
resident, brings action within this state; (2) the debtor cannot pro-
tect his exemption where the creditor, a non-resident, brings his
action in a state foreign to the debtor.
J. CARLYLE RUTLEDGE.
Landlord and Tenant-SetOffs Against Lease Deposits.
A deposited $3,000 with B as a binder to insure A's taking pos-
session of a store under a build and lease contract.' A later became
indebted to B on a collateral agreement for construction extras. A
then assigned the deposit to C and later went bankrupt. Held, B is
entitled to a set-off for the extras against C.2 As the assignee can
take no more than the assignor had,3 the real question at issue is
what were B's rights against A, the assignor.
Such deposits are generally held not to create a debtor-creditor
- relationship. Two cases especially may be pointed out. In one, the
'Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625, 49 L. ed. 1023 (1904);
Sexton v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 132 N. C. 1, 43 S. E. 479 (1903) ; Balk v.
Harris, 132 N. C. 10, 43 S. E. 477 (1903) ; Watson v. Seaboard R. Co., 198
N. C. 471, 152 S. E. 408 (1930) ; Penn. R. Co. v. Rogers, supra note 7.
" Manufacturing Co. v. Freeman, 175 N. C. 212, 95 S. E. 367 (1918);
Wabash R. Co. v. Tourville, 179 U. S. 322, 21 Sup. Ct. 113, 45 L. ed. 210
(1900); Shinn v. Zimmerman, 3 Zabriskie (N. J.) 150 (1851); McIntosh,
op. cit. supra note 6 §819.
1 Receipt for the deposit read: "Received of A, check for Three Thousand
Dollars ($3,000.00) to be held by us as a binder to guarantee your carrying out
lease made between yourselves and B, said lease being on store located at ....
same to be returned when satisfactory bond is furnished or when you begin
occupying store. Signed, B." *
'Commercial National Bank v. Cutter Realty Co., 205 N. C. 99, 170 S. E.
139 (1933).
' Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24 (1881) ; N. C. CODE Aix. (Michie, 1931) §446.
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deposit was expressly held to be a pledge.4 In another, the lessee
was allowed damages for conversion of the sum by the lessor.5
Accordingly, it is the usual view that these deposits are subject to
set-offs and counterclaims only in connection with the express .pur-
poses for which the deposits were made.6 For instance, in a New
York case,7 a deposit was made to secure payment of rent and taxes.
Lessee, evicted for non-payment of rent, was held entitled to the
deposit minus only the rent due and not the depreciation in rental
value or costs of the dispossess action. The reasoning advanced in
these cases is that the deposit is still the property of the lessee and
the lessor has merely a right to hold it until the conditions for which
it was given are fulfilled or made impossible of fulfillment. In every
case, the deposit receipt or the deposit clause in the lease or contract
determined the extent of these conditions.
In view of these decisions, it seems that the holding of the prin-
cipal case was erroneous. B's interest in the $3,000 consisted of a
right to retain it if A did not go into possession. But A went into
possession, thereby cutting off this claim. To allow B to set-off an
unsecured claim for extra construction costs is not only to go outside
of the express conditions limiting B's interest in the deposit, but to
allow an unjustified preference to a creditor of a bankrupt as well.
PETER HAIRSTON, JR.
Real Property-Registration-Mortgage of Wife Without
Privy Examination.
A man and his wife borrowed money to purchase realty, giving a
note secured by a deed of trust on the property purchased. No
acknowledgment or privy examination of the wife was actually had,
though the notary's certificate stated the contrary and the registra-
tion was apparently regular. Subsequently a valid deed of trust was
executed and recorded. In an action by the wife to restrain a fore-
' Kaufman v. Williams, 92 N. J. L. 182, 104 AtI. 202 (1918).
5Atlas v. Moritz, 217 App. Div. 38, 216 N. Y. S. 490 (1926). But note that
in Goodman v. Scharched, 144 Misc. Rep. 905, 260 N. Y. S. 883 (1932), the
holding was limited to cases where the deposit was expressly given as security.
I Set-off allowed: Burke v. Norton, 42 Cal. App. 705, 184 Pac. 45 (1919) ;
Lieberman v. Lavene, 253 Mass. 579, 149 N. E. 625 (1925); Sockloff v. Burn-
stein, 177 App. Div. 471, 164 N. Y. S. 262 (1917). Set-off denied: Rez v.
Summers, 34 Cal. App. 527, 168"Pac. 156 (1917) ; Shanklin v. Kamin, 197 Ill.
App. 630 (1916) ; see Knight v. Marks, 183 Cal. 354, 191 Pac. 531, 532 (1920).
Crausman v. Graham Const. Co., 95 Misc. Rep. 608, 159 N. Y. S. 709
(1916).
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closure and sale under the first deed of trust it was held, that though
the first deed of trust was admittedly invalid and equity would not
enforce a specific performance, the amount so loaned would consti-
tute an equitable lien on the land. The Supreme Court in affirming
the dissolution of the injunction and decision of the lower court al-
lowed priority to the first deed of trust.1
As between the alleged grantor and grantee the attempted con-
veyance by a married woman of her realty is a nullity in absence of
her privy examination.2 Though specific performance quite gen-
erally has been denied, the property in some cases has been charged
with an equitable lien where the married woman 'has received the
benefits of the transaction.m3 In all such cases in North Carolina no
subsequent incumbrancer was involved.4 Other cases have held the
married woman liable in damages for breach of her contract to
convey.5
Conceding the justice of the principal case as between the parties,
what effect should the equitable lien have upon the priority of a sub-
sequent incumbrancer: (1) where the first deed is unregistered, and
(2) where registered?
(1) If the first deed of trust is unregistered it will be ineffective
'Boyett v. First National Bank of Durham, 204 N. C. 639, 169 S. E. 231
(1933). Under the decision of the lower court, affirmed, the payees of the
notes secured by the first deed of trust were held entitled to a sale of such
land to satisfy the balance due, the proceeds of such sale to be applied as fol-
lows: (1) To the costs of the sale, (2) the payees of the notes secured by the
first deed of trust, (3) to clerk of court to hold for subsequent incumbrancers
or claimants.
'Smith v. Ingram, 130 N. C. 100, 40 S. E. 984 (1902) ; Warren v. Dail, 170.
N. C. 406, 87 S. E. 126 (1915) ; Hardy v. Abdallah, 192 N. C. 45, 133 S. E.
195 (1926) ; N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §997; TIFFANy, REAL PROPERTY
(1912) §477.
'Burns v. McGregor, 90 N. C. 222 (1884) ; North v. Bunn, 122 N. C. 766,
29 S. E. 776 (1898) ; Gann v. Spencer, 167 N. C. 429, 83 S. E. 620 (1914) (as
to betterments) ; TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (1912) §564.
" In Burns v. McGregor, supra note 3, a married woman contracted to con-
vey a smaller for a larger tract of land and to give a mortgage back to secure
the difference in price. After execution of the deed she refused to acknowledge
the mortgage back as of her own free will. Held, the land conveyed to her is
subject to the price by reason of an equitable lien-if she keeps the property
she must pay the debt. (But no subsequent incumbrancer was involved.)
'Warren v. Dail, supra note 2 (though a married woman cannot convey
realty without a privy examination she may be held for damages for breach of
a contract to convey land, but equity will not decree specific performance);
Foster v. Williams, 182 N. C. 632, 109 S. E. 834 (1921) (no lien was allowed
where the deed of trust was invalid for want of privy examination of the
wife).
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as notice as against a subsequent creditor or purchaser for value
holding under a registered instrument. 6 No notice, however full or
formal, will supply the want of registration.
7
In (2), where the first deed is registered, two problems arise:
what effect has it as notice (a) where such deed is defective on its
face as to acknowledgment or proof of probate, and (b) where such
defect is latent?
As to (a), North Carolina has consistently held that a deed,
though registered, when defective on its face, is no notice to sub-
sequent incumbrancers. 8 The result is not so clear where the de-
fective probate is latent, i.e. does not appear upon the face of the
instrument.
North Carolina has held that where the defect in the registered
instrument is due to the disqualification of the probating officer, and
such defect is latent, one taking under the grantee in such instrument
gets a good title unless the one claiming the benefit of the defective
registration is "cognizant of the facts."9 But in such a situation the
conveyance itself was valid as between the parties without registra-
tion.' 0 In the principal case the probate of the first deed of trust
was latently defective in that there was a complete absence of the
wife's privy examination. The registration should not be effective
as notice to the subsequent incumbrancer, for, as between the parties,
such a deed is a nullity." The wife could set up the absence of the
privy examination to avoid the deed apparently regular on the pro-
bate,12 Consolidated Statutes Section 1001 not applying to such a
ON. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3309 provides that no conveyance of
realty will be valid as against creditors or. bona fide purchasers unless .regis-
tered.
7Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 43 S. E. 579 (1903) ; Buchanan v. Clark,
164 N. C. 56, 71, 80 S. E. 424 (1913) ; Duncan v. Gully, 199 N. C. 552, 155 S. E.
167 (1930) ; TiFFANy, REAL PROPERT (1912) §478 and notes.
8 Wood v. Lewey, 153 N. C. 401, 69 S. E. 268 (1910) ; Fibre Co. v. Cozad,
183 N. C. 600, 112 S. E. 810 (1922) ; Bank v. Tolbert, 192 N. C. 126, 133 S. E.
558 (1926).
'Blanton v. Bostic, 126 N. C. 418, 35 S. E. 1035 (1900) ; Bank v. Tolbert,
supra note 8.
"'Blanton v. Bostic, supra note 9; Warren v. Williford, 62 S. E. 697, 148
N. C. 474 (1908) ; Weston v. Roper Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 263, 266, 75 S. E.
800 (1912).
u Supra note 2.
"Benedict v. Jones, 129 N. C. 470, 40 S. E. 221 (1901) ; Davis v. Davis,
146 N. C. 163, 59 S. E. 654 (1907); Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 145 N. C. 339,
59 S. E. 134 (1907).
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situation. s It has been held that a deed void for want of mental
capacity of the grantor will not be validated by proper registration
even as against subsequent incumbrancers. 14 ' A married woman's
conveyance without her privy examination is equally void, and it is
difficult to see how a void deed acquires any additional validity for
registration and notice purposes because it seems to be regular. To
hold otherwise would be to give the registration acts an unintended
effect by allowing them to abrogate the requirements as to a married
woman's conveyance of her realty.15
The privy examination of the wife being prerequisite to a valid
conveyance of her realty, it is submitted the Court is allowing in-
directly that which is prohibited directly by permitting an apparently
regular registration to validate a void instrument and to charge a
subsequent incumbrancer with notice so as to defeat his priority.
Though it is doubtful that the Court intended to go so far, it has
apparently done so in affirming the decision of the lower court.
HENRY L. ANDERSON.
Sales-Conditional Sales-Registration.
Dealer sold automobiles to customers on conditional sale and
assigned the contracts to finance company, with an unrecorded agree-
ment that repossessed cars should be purchased by dealer from
finance company for the unpaid balance due from customers. Finance
company was to hold title, dealer to be bailee for storage only, with
duty to deliver to finance company on demand. Finance company
claimed several cars so held from the dealer's receiver. Held, for
claimant; the agreement was not a conditional sale and need not be
recorded.'
Either by express statutory provision or by judicial construction
the requisite of recordation has been imposed upon chattel mort-
" N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1001 providing that an innocent pur-
chaser is not affected by fraud in the treaty if the privy examination is regular,
does not apply to situations where there is a complete absence of privy ex-
amination. See Davis v. Davis, supra note 13.
"'Thompson v. Thomas, 163 N. C. 500, 79 S. E. 896 (1913).
1 The requirements prerequisite to a married womanes valid conveyance of
-her realty are specifically set forth. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §997.
The registration acts (N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3309) are for the
-protection of subsequent creditors and purchaser for value, and not for the
purpose of correcting defects in the execution of an instrument of conveyance.
Cutter Realty Co. v. Moneyhun Co., Inc., 204 N. C. 651, 169 S. E. 274
<1933).
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gages,2 conditional sales,8 and in some cases, trust receipts ;4 all of
which, according to the weight of authority, have the common fea-
ture of some form of divided ownership.5 Although by the condi-
tional sales agreement title is retained in the vendor, it is generally
recognized that such title is for security purposes only, the vendee
having the beneficial ownership, as well as the possession of the
property.
6
The view that mere possession is not sufficient indicia of owner-
ship to mislead third parties, however, has kept leases, 7 bailments,8
and consignments9 from inclusion in the above group. Consequently,
evasion of the recordation statutes has often been attempted by
drafting a sales agreement to simulate one of these transactions. In
such cases the court will construe the contract according to its essen-
tial character.' 0
It is often difficult to distinguish a conditional sale camouflaged
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3311.
'Kornegay v. Kornegay, 109 N. C. 188, 13 S. E. 770 (1891); N. C. CoDE
ANN. (Michie, 1931) §3312; HAINRG, CONDITIONAL SALES LAWS (3rd ed.
1927) 18 (list of states requiring recordation of conditional sales).
'General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boddeker, 274 S. W. 1016 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925) ; In re Richheimer, 221 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915) ; In re Bett-
man-Johnson Co., 250 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
'VOLD, SALES (1931) 265 (chattel mortgages), 270 (conditional sales), 346
(trust receipts).
'Universal Credit Co. v. Mamminga, 214 Iowa 1135, 243 N. W. 513 (1932);
Observer Co. v. Little, 175 N. C. 42, 94 S. E. 526 (1907) (conditional sales
regarded in effect as chattel mortgages); cf. Citizenes Bank v. Mullis, 161 Ga.
371, 131 S. E. 44 (1925) (conditional seller is not a mere lienor, but stands in
the position of absolute owner).
"Foreman v. Drake, 98 N. C. 311, 3 S. E. 842 (1887).
'Shaffer v. Lacy, 121 Cal. 574, 54 Pac. 72 (1898). Contra: In re Tansil,
17 F. (2d) 413 (D. C. S. C. 1922) (South Carolina statute requires recordation
of bailment contracts).
'Empire Drill Co. v. Allison, 94 N. C. 548 (1886).
0 Contracts in the form of leases held conditional sales. Puffer and Sons
Mfg. Co. v. Lucas, 112 N. C. 378, 17 S. E. 174 (1893); Wilcox Bros. v. Cherry,
123 N. C. 79, 31 S. E. 369 (1898). Contracts in the form of bailments held
conditional sales. Boon v. Moss, 70 N. Y. 465 (1877) ; Hamilton v. Highlands,
144 N. C. 279, 56 S. E. 929 (1907). Contracts in the form of consignments
for sale held conditional sales. Kellam v. Brown, 112 N. C. 451, 17 S. E. 416
(1893) ; Arbuckle Bros. v. Gates, 95 Va. 802, 30 S. E. 496 (1898).
Much of the difficulty is eliminated by the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
§1, which defines a conditional sale as "(1) any contract for the sale of goods
under which the possession is delivered to the buyer and the property in the
goods is to vest in the buyer at a subsequent time upon the payment of part or
all of the price, or upon the performance of any other condition or the happen-
ing of any contingency; or (2) any contract for the bailment or leasing of
goods by which the bailee or lessee contracts to pay as compensation a sum
substantially equivalent to the value of the goods, and by which it is agreed
that the bailee or lessee is bound to become, or has the option of becoming the
owner of such goods upon the full compliance with the terms of the contract."
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as a bailment. The most approved distinction is that a conditional
sale contemplates passage of title to the vendee and payment of the
price by him, while a bailment contemplates that title shall remain in
the bailor and that the property shall be returned to him."1 Seem-
ingly the contract in the present case falls under the concept of a
conditional sale. The provision that the finance company may de-
mand possession before default does not prevent a conditional sale
from resulting.' 2 However, in practically all cases where an osten-
sible bailment was held a conditional sale the possessor had the right
of use or disposal of the property to some extent, while in the prin-
cipal case the possession of the dealer was limited to storage. Nev-
ertheless, many courts have held certain trust receipt agreements in
which the vendor retains title and the vendee holds the property in
trust for storage only to be in effect conditional sales.'
3
The bailment in the principal case seems colorable. The clear
intent of the parties appears to be that the claimant should not demand
possession unless the dealer defaulted in payment. The facts present
an especially deceptive situation, since the cars are the very ones over
which the dealer has formerly exercised control by selling to cus-
tomers. Good policy demands recordation of such agreements.
J. A. KLEEMEIER, JR.
Workmen's Compensation-Subrogation-Defenses Available
to Negligent Third Parties.
While driving a truck of X Company across the defendant's rail-
road track, an employee of the company was killed by a train. While
'Morris v. Boston Music Co., 129 Minn. 198, 151 N. W. 971 (1917).; Ver-
mont Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 At. 199 (1931).
' Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co. v. Lawson, 237 Fed. 877 (S. D.
Iowa 1916) ; In -re Shiffert, 281 Fed. 284 (E. D. Pa. 1922). Certainly a right
in the finance company to demand possession before default would not prevent
a conditional sale under a dictum of the North Carolina court giving any
conditional vendor such a right. See State v. Stinett, 203 N. C. 829, 167 S. E.
63 (1933) criticised in (1933) 11 N. C. L. REv. 321.
" In re Cullen, 282 Fed. 902 (D.Md. 1922); Commonwealth Finance Co. v.
Schutt, 97 N. J. L. 225, 116 Atl. 722 (1922).
However, a tripartite trust receipt agreement, in which the vendee was to
hold for storage, was not to use or dispose of cars, and was to deliver to
finance company on demand was held merely a bailment. General Motors Ac-
ceptance Corp. v. Hupfer, 113 Neb. 228, 202 N. W. 627 (1925). In In re Otto-
Johnson Mercantile Co., 52 F. (2d) 678 (D. N. M. 1928) the court held a
similar agreement to be a bailment intimating it could not be a conditional sale
because the manufacturer was the real dealer. In Hanna, Trut Receipts
(1929) 29 CoL L. RPv. 545 it is noted that some courts regard the trust receipt
as sui generis. See (1931) 9 N. C. L. Rsv. 468.
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an action by the deceased's administrator was pending, an award was
made under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The complaint was
then amended so as to make the X Company a real party in interest.
The defendant set up the contributory negligence of X Company in
allowing its employee to use a truck with defective brakes. Held:
Valid defense.1
As the Workmen's Compensation Acts are never exactly alike in
any two states, the jurisdictions differ materially on the question of
who has the right to bring an action against a third party whose
negligence has caused the injury or death of an employee operating
under the Act. Most of them, however, may be placed within one
of the following categories: (1) Those in which there is a statutory
provision to the effect that, if the negligent third party is operating
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, his liability is limited to
the amount of the award specified in the Act, and the employer or
his insurance carrier 'has the exclusive right to maintain an action
against the third party for injury to or death of an employee. 2 (2)
Those in which the action may be maintained either by the employer
or the employee.8 (3) Those in which the employee has the option
of maintaining an action against the third party or against the em-
ployer; but if he elects to do the latter and an award is made, he is
considered to have given up his right to sue the third party. 4 North
Carolina adopts the latter view, and the employee, or his represent-
ative, is privileged to begin both actions at once, with the employer
being subrogated to the rights of the employee, or his representative,
after an award has been made.5 It has been held that if the em-
ployer fails to take advantage of his right of subrogation, the em-
ployee, or his representative, may sue the third person.6
When the employer does exercise his right, it is held, with the
exception of a few cases, 7 that his concurring negligence is not a
1Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N. C. 668, 169 S. E. 419 (1933).2 Wendt & Crane Co. v. Traff, 262 IIl. App. 58 (1931).
'McKenzie v. Mo. Stables, 327 Mo. 88, 34 S. W. (2d) 136 (1930).
"Holmes v. Henry Jennings & Sons, 7 Fed. (2d) 231 (D. C. 1921); State
v. Francis, 150 Md. 285, 134 Atl. 26 (1926).
Phifer v. Berry, 202 N. C. 388, 163 S. E. 119 (1932); Prigden & U. S.
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. v. Ry. & Carolina Delivery Service, 203 N. C. 62, 164
S. E. 325 (1932) ; McCarley v. Council and Sutton 205 N. C. 370, 171 S. E. 323
(1933).
6 Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Palmer, 149 Va. 560, 140 S. E. 831 (1927).
7 Thornton v. Reese, 246 N. W. 527 (Minn. 1933); Corey & Son, Lt'd. v.
France, Fenwick & Co., Lt'd. (1911) 1 K. B. 114; Canadian P. R. Co. v. Alberta
Clay Products, Lt'd., 8 B. W. C. C. 675 (Can. 1914) (cited and distinguished in
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valid defense.8 This result is reached through the following process
of reasoning: (1) No exceptions are made in the statutes to the rule
that for the purpose of this suit the employer is subrogated to every
right of the employee, or his representative.9 (2) As the right of the
employee, or his representative, to compensation exists solely because
of the Workmen's Compensation Act and not because of the neg-
ligence of the employer, the latter should not be precluded from a
recovery against a negligent third person by his own contributony
negligence. 10 (3) As evidence of the amount of compensation paid is
not admissible in the third party action, it is impossible to measure
the effect of the employer's contributory negligence. 1 The cases in
the United States holding that the defense is available to the third
party maintain that the statutes providing for subrogation do not
contemplate a situation in which the employer's negligence contrib-
uted to the injury. The actual rights of the employee, or his repre-
sentative, are transferred to the employer only when his hands are
clean.12 In view of the fact that not one of the statutes makes
exception to the rule that the employer is subrogated to the rights of
an employee, or his representative, it would seem that the holding of
the principal case is fallacious.
Following the reasoning of the majority holding, it has been held
that the statute of limitations begins running on the employer's right
of action from the time of the injury.13 As the North Carolina
statute provides that the employer may institute action before pay-
ment of an award in order to protect the loss of his rights by the
Milosevich et. al. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 68 Cal. App. 662, 230 Pac. 15
(1924).
8 Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller & Paine, 240 Fed. 376 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917);
Milosevich et. at. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., spra note 7; Fidelity & Casualty
Co. v. Cedar Valley Electric Co., 187 Ia. 1014, 174 N. W. 709 (1919); City of
Shreveport v. Southwestern Gas & Electric Co., 145 La. 679, 82 So. 785
(1919); General Box Co. v. Mo. Utilities Co., 55 S. W. (2d) 442 (Mo.
1932) ; Graham v. City of Lincoln et at., 106 Neb. 305, 183 N. W. 569 (1921).
9 General Box Co. v. Mo. Utilities Co., supra note 8.
See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Cedar Valley Electric Co., supra note 8, at
1019 ("A discussion of the right of one joint tort-feasor to contribution from
another, or of the right of one injured person, who has recovered judgment
against, made settlement with, one joint tort-feasor to recover against another,
is not germane to the question.").
"Milosevich et al. v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., supra note 7.
"Thornton Bros. v. Reese, supra note 7; Brown v. So. Ry., supra note 1.
"Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Indianapolis & Cinc. Traction Co.,
195 Ind. 91, 142 N. E. 856 (1924) ; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ladd, 121 Kan.
659, 249 Pac. 687 (1926) ; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blue Diamond Coal
Co., 170 S. E. 728 (Va. 1933) ; Contra: Star Brewing Co. v. Cleveland, C. C. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 275 Fed. 330 (C. C. A. 7th, 1921).
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passage of time,' 4 it is reasonable to infer that we would adopt this
view. It is generally conceded that as agairist the employer the third
party can not avail himself of the defense that a settlement has been
made with the employee, unless the employer has consented theretoY15
Since he is considered to stand in the position of the employee as
against a third party,16 any defense which would be available to the
third party in an action by the employee, or his representative, is valid
when the employer brings the action.
17
EmmETT C. WILLIS, JR.
1 N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §1081(r).
5Pizcz v. Schultz et. al., 236 App. Div. 552, 261 N. Y. S. 198 (1932);
Smith v. Yellow Cab Co., 288 Pa. 85, 135 Atl. 558 (1927). Contra: Gones v.
Fisher, 286 Ill. 606, 122 N. E. 94 (1919) (on the grounds that there being only
one cause of action, any settlement will destroy it).
' General Box Co. v. Mo. Utilities Co., supra note 8.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Ladd, mspra note 13; (1933) 33 Cor. L. REv.
550.
